The first is the crisis of overextension, or the growing gap between imperial reach and
imperial grasp, the most striking example of which is the US's being drawn into a
quagmire in Iraq. This has led to an erosion of its strategic position globally and made
the threat of the employment of US military force to discipline recalcitrant governments
and forces throughout the world less credible than it was three years ago. Hugo
Chavez' scintillating defiance of American power would not be possible without the Iraqi
resistance's successfully pinning down US interventionist forces in a war without end.
The second is the crisis of overproduction, overaccumulation, or overcapacity. This
refers to the growing gap between the tremendous productive capacity of the global
capitalist system and the limited global demand for the commodities produced by this
system. The result has been, over time, drastically lowered growth rates in the central
economies, stagnation, and a crisis of profitability. Efforts by global capital to regain
profitability by more intensively exploiting labor in the North or moving out to take
advantage of significantly lower wages elsewhere have merely exacerbated the crisis.
On the one hand, neoliberal policies in the North and structural adjustment programs in
the South have gutted global demand. On the other hand, the export of capital has
created massive new industrial capacity in China and selected other countries. New
productive capacity and stagnant if not declining global demand is the recipe for the
exacerbation of the crisis of profitability.
One indicator of the deepening crisis of profitability is that competition has replaced
cooperation as the dominant aspect of the relationship among global capitalist elites. From the project of globalization that more or less united the global capitalist class
during the Clinton era, we have entered, in the Bush period, into a period of intense
national or regional capitalist competition. In so far as the Bush administration adheres
to the globalist capitalist project, it is that of managed globalization, one that ensures
that US corporate interests do not get hurt but become the main beneficiaries of the
process. Protection for US corporate interests and free trade for the rest of the world-
this is the operational dictum of Washington, one that is now on display in the US's
adamant refusal to abide by the NAFTA ruling on Canadian softwood imports. Given
this nationalist-protectionist posture on the part of Washington, it is not surprising that
the WTO talks leading to the Sixth Ministerial in Hong Kong are in danger of collapse.
The third dimension of the crisis that I identify is the crisis of legitimacy of US
hegemony. This, I think, is as serious as the other two crises, since, as an admirer of
Gramsci, I do think that legitimacy, more than force or the market, is the lynchpin of a
system of social relations. One dimension of this crisis of legitimacy is the crisis of the
multilateral system of global economic governance owing to the US' no longer wanting
to act as a primus inter pares, or first among equals, in the WTO, World Bank, and the
IMF, and its wishing to unilaterally pursue its interests through these mechanisms, thus
seriously impairing their credibility, legitimacy, and functioning as global institutions.
Another dimension of this crisis of legitimacy is the crisis of Lockean democracy, that
model of democratic rule that the US has promoted as the system of self-rule both in the
North and in the South. I would like to focus the rest of my talk on this dimension of the
crisis of hegemony.
Lockean democracy is in crisis throughout the whole world today. This is ironic, given
the fact that just over a decade ago, liberal democracy American-style was supposed to
sweep everything before it. How different from the Fukuyaman end-of-history mood is
the sense of crisis today, one that the thinker Richard Rorty captures quite well in his
comment: "In the worst case scenario, historians will someday have to explain why the
golden age of Western democracy, like the age of the Antonines, lasted only about two
hundred years."(1)
I must confess that I know little about Canada, but I do follow some of the debate on the
national security regime to realize that the paranoidal tightening of national security
practices in the name of combating terrorism-including complicity in the rendition of
one's citizens to another country, where they are likely to undergo torture, as in the Arar
case–poses a serious threat to the term "liberal" in liberal democracy.
I know more about your lovely neighbor, the United States. There, the "democracy" in
liberal democracy has long been put into question by the massive hijacking of elections
by corporate financing that has corrupted both the Republican and Democratic parties
and the systematic disenfranchisement of poor people symbolized by the Florida
elections of 2000 and the Ohio elections of 2004.
There, corporate rule has reached its apogee with George W. Bush doing the bidding of
US industry in torpedoing the Kyoto Protocol, awarding his vice president's corporate
allies such as Halliburton with no-bid contracts, going to war for his oil cronies, and
creating a free-market paradise for US corporations in Iraq.
There, the military establishment has become so unaccountable to its nominal civilian
superiors that one cannot but agree with William Pfaff when he writes, "The United
States is not yet eighteenth century Prussia, when the military owned the state, [but] the
threat is more serious than most Americans realize."(2)
There, the "liberal" in liberal democracy has been subverted by a Patriot Act that
eliminates many of the few barriers that had remained between the individual and total
monitoring and control by Big Brother. The Patriot Act is best described by Harvard
Professor Elaine Scarry as "a gigantic license to search and seize that violates the
Fourth Amendment."(3)
What is clear is that what prides itself as the first modern democracy has ceased to be
a model for the rest of the world. What I would like to dwell on a bit is the state of democracy in the developing world.
Just a decade ago, we were supposed to be in the midst of Samuel Huntington's so
called "third wave" of democratization, as country after country in Latin America, Asia,
and Africa threw off ruling dictatorships and adopted variants of the Anglo-American
democratic model. Today the recurrent question is: are we undergoing a reversal of
that wave? Let me take as an example of the changing fortunes of democracy the situation in my
country, the Philippines.
Whatever Happened to People Power?
"People power" used to be synonymous with the Philippines. In February 1986 Filipinos
captured the imagination of the world when they rushed out to the streets to support a
military rising and ousted the strongman Ferdinand Marcos. Fifteen years later, in
January 2001, they again surged to the streets to bring down President Joseph Estrada,
who was widely believed to be the recipient of hundreds of millions of pesos from
illegal gambling activities. Today, however, they are largely absent while another
president stands accused, this time of stealing elections.
Intercepted telephone conversations between President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and
an electoral commissioner during the elections of May 2004 showed her attempting to
influence the outcome of the polls. Unable to deny it was her voice in the taped
intercepts, Arroyo publicly apologized for a "lapse in judgment." Instead of defusing the
situation, the admission triggered widespread calls for her to resign.
In early September 2005, nearly three months after the scandal broke, Arroyo blocked a
bid to impeach her, clinging to power despite a recent poll giving her the lowest overall
performance rating among the country's five most recent presidents. Those numbers
were not, however, translated into numbers in the streets. The biggest rally anti-Arroyo
forces could muster numbered, at most, 40,000. In contrast, hundreds of thousands had
clogged the main highway running through Manila, popularly known as "EDSA," for days
on end in 1986 and 2001.
What happened, asked Manila's veteran street activists. Why were the people no
longer protesting a clear-cut case of electoral fraud by a president who was already
vastly unpopular owing to ineptitude, uninspiring leadership and widely believed
allegations of corruption even before the telephone intercepts surfaced?
The truth is that while people dislike Arroyo, they are also deeply disillusioned with the
political system, which has come to be known as the "EDSA State." Conversations with
middle- and lower-class citizens inevitably produce the same answer to why they're not
out demonstrating: "Well, whoever replaces her will probably be as bad, if not worse."
Intrigued at the discovery that only a handful of students in my undergraduate class in
political sociology at the University of the Philippines, the traditional hotbed of activism,
had attended the rallies, I posed to them the question, "Is this democracy worth
saving?" Two thirds said no.
Rather than taking to the streets, people are fleeing in large numbers to Europe, the
United States and the Middle East. Some 10 percent of the Filipino labor force now
works overseas, and one out of every four Filipinos wants to emigrate. It is estimated
that at least 30 percent of Filipino households now subsist on remittances sent by 8
million
expatriates.
The widespread cynicism about democracy is understandable, especially when
Filipinos compare their lot with the Chinese or the Vietnamese. Some point out bitterly
that while authoritarian Vietnam reduced the proportion of the population living in
extreme poverty from 51 percent in 1990 to 10 percent in 2003, the Philippines could
only bring it down from 20 percent to 14 percent in the same period. They decry the fact
that at 0.46, the Philippines' gini coefficient, the most reliable measure of inequality, is
the worst in Southeast Asia.
These statistics come alive with a tour of metro Manila's vast shantytowns, where
conditions of urban squalor are unparalleled in the region. During a recent visit to the
sprawling Tatalon slum in Quezon City, a constant refrain from people I interviewed was
that all recent administrations were the same in one respect: They had done absolutely
nothing for poor people, though a few conceded that "Erap [former President Estrada]
had a heart."
Elite Capture of Democratic Processes
I think that one key reason for the crisis of democracy in the developing world is that
electoral democracies of the kind favored by the West have been extraordinarily
vulnerable to being hijacked by elites. The system of democracy reestablished in the
Philippines after the ouster of the Marcos dictatorship in 1986 illustrates the problem. It
is one that encourages maximum factional competition among the elite while allowing
them to close ranks against any change in the social and economic structure.
The Philippine system is democratic in the narrow sense of making elections the arbiter
of political succession. In the principle of "one man/woman, one vote, there is formal
equality. Yet this formal equality cannot but be subverted by its being embedded in a
social and economic system marked by great disparities of wealth and income.
Like the American political system on which it is modeled, the genius of the Philippine
democratic system, from the perspective of the elite, is the way it harnesses elections
to socially conservative ends.(4) Running for office at any level of government is
prohibitively expensive, so that only the wealthy or those backed by wealth can usually
stand for elections. Thus the masses do choose their representatives but from a
limited pool of people of means that may belong to different factions-those "in" and
those "out" of power-but are not different in terms of their political programs. The
beauty of the system in the eyes of the elite is that by periodically engaging the people
in an exercise to choose among different members of the elite, elections make voters
active participants in legitimizing the social and economic status quo. Thus has
emerged the great Philippine paradox: an extremely lively play of electoral politics
unfolding above a class structure that is one of the most immobile
in Asia.
Allowing for institutional and cultural variations, one can say that
the dynamics of
democratic politics in countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Mexico,
Ecuador, and
Thailand are similar to those in the Philippines. Elite democracy is
one word that some
have used to describe this system. Polyarchy is another.
However, elite capture of democratic processes is, in my view, only
one factor that
subverted the performance of the new democracies that emerged in
the 1980s. Another
development was equally critical: their economic promise was
undermined by the
demands of external actors.
The External Subversion of Democracy
Let us revisit that historic conjuncture of the early 1980s. The
military dictatorships
were collapsing not only because of internal resistance but also
because key external
actors such as the United States, European Union, the World
Bank, and International
Monetary Fund (IMF) withdrew their support from them. Now, one
of the major reasons
for this about face was that the dictatorships had lost the
credibility, legitimacy, and
minimum support to impose the economic reform programs, better
known as "structural
adjustment," that these influential forces demanded. Promoted as
necessary for
economic efficiency, these programs were designed to more widely
open these
economies to foreign capital and foreign trade and to enable
countries to pay off their
enormous foreign debts.
For instance, in Brazil and Argentina, tight monetary policies and
tight fiscal policies
drew opposition not only from labor and other civil society
groupings in the early
eighties but also from business groups. Business interests once
benefited from labor-
repressive policies imposed by these military dictatorships. Now,
however, business
circles began to distance themselves from repressive governments
when neoliberal
policies failed to produce the promised economic growth. As
Stephen Haggard and
Robert Kaufmann observed:
With economic problems mounting, business elites began to
reevaluate the costs and
benefits of the technocratic decision-making style that
characterized authoritarian rule.
Business groups had complained periodically about their lack of
access to the remote
technocrats who conducted macroeconomic policy, but such
concerns had been offset
by particularistic benefits and the fact that governments were
willing to repress popular
sector challenges. The private sector's gradual disaffection did not
reflect a democratic
epiphany, but a pragmatic response to changing circumstances.
With authoritarian
governments increasingly unable to deliver their side of the bargain,
"voice" began to
appear increasingly important to business groups, even if it meant
reopening the arena
to the previously excluded popular sectors.(5)
The democratic governments which displaced authoritarian regimes
soon confronted
their own dilemma. On the one hand, redistributive policies were
blocked by elites that
had joined the anti-dictatorship coalition, a development that we
have already
discussed. At the same time, expansionary fiscal policies were
discouraged by the
World Bank and the IMF. It soon became clear that what the
multilateral agencies
wanted them to do was to use their democratic legitimacy to
impose structural
adjustment programs. In Argentina, for instance, the international
financial institutions
pressured the new government of Raul Alfonsin to abandon neo-
Keynesian policies,
implement tax reforms, liberalize trade, and privatize public
enterprises. When the
regime quailed, the World Bank "concluded that the government
had not made sufficient
progress toward its reform goals and suspended disbursements on
a structural
adjustment loan."(6)
Electoral democracy became the prime mechanism for the
imposition of stabilization or
structural adjustment programs in Jamaica, Haiti. the Philippines,
Peru, and Pakistan.
In Jamaica, the progressive Manley government suffered a
devastating loss of
legitimacy when it caved in to pressure to impose an IMF
stabilization program blessed
by Washington. The program eroded living standards. It led to
Manley's crushing
defeat in the 1980 elections by a successor who proceeded to
continue the same
policies at the behest of the IMF. In Peru, the government of
Alberto Fujimori was
elected on a populist, anti-IMF platform, but proceeded to impose a
neoliberal "shock"
programs that included steep price increases in the rates charged
by state enterprises
as well as radical trade liberalization.(7) These measures provoked
a deep recession,
leading to popular discontent that in turn provoked Fujimori to
suspend the constitution,
close Congress, and rule as a strongman with little respect for
constitutional restraints.
In the Philippines, the US and the multilateral agencies abandoned
Marcos. Not only
was his political position untenable owing to massive popular
resistance, but his
government's lack of legitimacy had made it an ineffective
instrument for repaying the
massive $28 billion foreign debt and for implementing IMF
stabilization policies. An
economic crisis accompanied the end of the old regime, but that
did not stop the World
Bank and the IMF from demanding that the fledgling democratic
government of
President Corazon Aquino make debt repayment its top national
economic priority.
People were shocked, and some of Aquino's economic advisers
protested, but the
government submitted, issuing a decree that affirmed the
"automatic appropriation" of
the full amount needed to service the foreign debt from the budget
of the national
government. With some 40 to 50 per cent of the budget going to
service the debt, this
practically precluded national development, since all that was left
went to salaries and
operational expenses, with little left over for capital expenditures.
In some years, 10
per cent of the country's GDP was spent servicing its foreign debt.
Thus, it is hardly
surprising then that the Philippines registered average growth of
below 1.5 per cent per
annum between 1983 and 1993.
It is ironic that today former President Aquino marches against
President Arroyo when
she herself was responsible for many economic policies, notably
the model debtor
policy, that Arroyo inherited.
As in Peru, Argentina, and the Philippines, the return of democracy
to Brazil was
accompanied by scarcely veiled warnings from the IMF and the US
that the first order of
business for the new regime was to accomplish what the exiting
military regime had
failed to do, that is, to impose stabilization programs raising
interest rates, cutting back
government expenditures, devaluing the currency, and liberalizing
trade. From the mid
-eighties to the 2002, a series of governments eroded the credibility
of democracy by
undertaking unsuccessful efforts to impose on a recalcitrant
population the economic
stabilization desired by Washington and the IMF.(8)
The latest victim is the government of "Lula" or Luis Inacio da Silva
of the Brazilian
Workers' Party, one of the most committed anti-neoliberal parties
on the continent.
Before he even won the presidential elections in the fall of 2002,
Lula did the
unprecedented in Latin America: he promised the IMF that he
would honor the high-
interest, expenditure-restrictive conditions of a stabilization loan
negotiated with the
outgoing President Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Lula acted under
duress. The Fund
made it clear it would not release the remaining $24 billion of the
stabilization loan
unless he behaved.
Lula was true to his word. Consequently, in 2003 Brazilian GDP
contracted by 0.2 per
cent in Lula's first year; unemployment surged to a record 13 per
cent. This bitter
medicine for the Brazilian people was, however, a tonic for foreign
investors.. In the
first eight months of the year, even though the economy remained
depressed, Brazilian
stocks soared by over 58 per cent, prompting Business Week to
advise speculative
investors: "Don't leave this party yet."(9) As for Lula, he faced
mounting criticism from
within his own Workers' Party and governing coalition as well as
from ordinary voters;
only 28 per cent of the population voicing support for his
government. (10) In other
words, even before the current crisis stemming from corruption
among Lula's closest
advisers, the government was already in trouble owing to its
adoption of contractionary
policies.
Reversal of the third wave of democratization now looms as a threat
throughout Latin
America, where a poll conducted by the United Nations
Development Program in 2004
that showed that 54.7 per cent of Latin Americans polled said they
would support
authoritarian regimes over democracy if the shift would resolve their
economic woes.
(11)
In South Asia reversal of the third wave is already a reality. When
Gen. Pervez
Musharraf seized power in Pakistan in October 1999, and sent the
Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharaf packing, he ended 11 years of unstable democracy.
So worrisome to
many orthodox students of democracy was Pakistan's democratic
breakdown that
analyst Larry Diamond wrote: "Pakistan [may] not be the the last
high-profile country to
suffer a breakdown of democracy. Indeed, if there is a 'third reverse
wave,' its origin
may well be dated to 12 October 1999….(12)
Post-mortems of Pakistan's parliamentary democracy tend to
focus on corruption,
collapse of the rule of law, ethnic and religious polarization, and
economic failure.
Other explanations center on an unaccountable military that had
enjoyed special
relations with the Pentagon owing to its key role in driving the
Russians out of
Afghanistan.
Certainly, all this played a part. But also crucial was the role
played by the IMF and
World Bank, which pushed the democratic regimes of both
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz
Sharif to impose stabilization and structural adjustment programs
that contributed
significantly to the rise of poverty and inequality as well as fall in
the growth rate. (13)
Noted one eminent Pakistani economist: "The almost obsessive
concern with short-term
macroeconomic stabilization has with it the danger…that some of
our basic social
programs might be affected, and this would have inter-generational
consequences on
development in Pakistan." (14) Since democracy became
associated with a rise in
poverty and economic stagnation, it is not surprising that the coup
was viewed with
relief by most Pakistanis, from both the middle classes and the
working masses.
The Challenge
In a recent essay, the philosopher Richard Rorty sketches a bleak
dystopian portrait of
where Western democracy is headed:
"At the end of this process of erosion, democracy would have been
replaced by
something quite different. This would probably be neither military
dictatorship nor
Orwellian totalitarianism, but rather a relatively benevolent
despotism, imposed by
what would gradually become a hereditary nomenklatura."
"That sort of power structure survived the end of the Soviet Union
and is now
resolidifying under Putin and his fellow KGB alumni. The same
structure seems to be
taking shape in China and in Southeast Asia. In countries run in
this way, public
opinion does not greatly matter. Elections may still be held, but
opposition parties are
now allowed to pose any serious threat to the powers that be.
Careers are less open to
talent, and more dependent on connections with powerful persons.
Since the courts and
police review boards are relatively powerless, it is often necessary
for shopkeepers to
pay protection money to the police, or to criminals tolerated by the
police, in order to
stay in business. It is dangerous for citizens to complain about
corruption about the
abuse of power by public officials. High culture is restricted to
areas that are irrelevant
to politics…No more uncensored media. No more student
demonstrations. Not much in
the way of civil society. In short, a return to the Ancien Regime,
with the national
security establishment of each country playing the role of court in
Versailles." (15)
This dark vision may not yet be applicable to western democracies,
though some of my
friends claim it is a perfect portrayal of Washington under the Bush
regime. It is,
however, a credible end point if the forces that are eviscerating
democracy are not
subdued.
This is not an unfamiliar vision. At the turn of the 20th century,
Max Weber referred to
the "iron cage" of bureaucratization and Robert Michels called
attention to the "iron law
of oligarchy." Today, the "iron cage" is being forged by a number of
forces:
bureaucratic centralization that has run out of control, the drive of a
national security
establishment playing on terrorist fears, corporate concentration
and control of
production and markets. In the case of the third world, one must
add to this brew the
draconian policies of powerful multilateral institutions and the
systematic subversion of
democratic mechanisms by local elites to gain a comprehensive
picture of the threats
that are strangling democracy globally.
To respond to these threats we very badly need first of all a
reconceptualization or
fundamental revisioning of democracy at various levels. Too long
have we identified
democracy with elections, so that once we had trooped to the polls
and elected the
people and party of our choice, we considered our democratic
responsibilities fulfilled.
Today, more than ever, today, Rousseau's warning about
representative systems being
corrupted so that they generate the corporate will of the
representatives rather than the
general will of the represented remains very relevant. Today more
than ever, Michels'
warning about elections becoming less a question of the people
freely choosing their
representatives than their so-called representatives using elections
to maintain
themselves in office rings true. Moving on boldly to innovate more
direct and
participatory methods of democratic governance is one of the key
challenges facing all
of us, and here the anti-globalization movement with its emphasis
of direct democratic
methods of decisionmaking can be of great assistance to us.
Then there is the challenge of how to restore equality as one of the
key dimensions of
democracy. We can no longer pretend that a functioning
democracy can be sustained
when there is a formal equality of citizens but there are very real
and large inequalities
of wealth among them. We have seen both in the United States
and in the developing
world the systematic perversion of democracy at every turn by money and wealth.
Campaign finance reform is only a first step in reversing this trend. In my view,
strengthening democracy is inseparable from achieving a more equitable distribution of
assets and income–meaning reversing the spontaneous drive of the market to create
and perpetuate inequalities. The disembedding of the market from society, to borrow an
image from the great Hungarian scholar Karl Polanyi, in the name of efficiency and
prosperity has been the greatest creator of inequality, the greatest subverter of
democratic legitimacy in the last quarter of a century. We have relearned the hard way
what we have been taught by the classic theorists of democracy-that you cannot divorce
equality from democracy. We have learned the hard way that, contrary to Milton
Friedman's classic dictum, market freedom translates to more freedom for corporations
and more unfreedom for citizens. We must understand that the modus vivendi between
democracy and capitalism called Lockean democracy has long been dysfunctional, and
that to survive, contemporary democracy must break out of the rigid Lockean shell that
now imprisons it.
We must, above all, face the fact that capitalism and democratic deepening are no
longer compatible, and that the challenge lies in the nature and degree of the restraints
that we put on the market while we restructure the system of production and
consumption around the satisfaction of the needs of people and the community rather
than profitability. Call this participatory economics, social democracy, people's
economics, or socialism-what is essential is that the market be drastically re-embedded
in society, subject to the primordial human values of community, justice, equality, and
solidarity.
Then, finally, there is the challenge of reining in the big bureaucracies which have come
to view themselves as above democratic politics. There are the corporate elites that
say that achieving efficiency in production and distribution can only be achieved
through hierarchical control–that democracy has to do strictly with political
representation but stops at the realm of production; the technocratic elites that say that
management of the modern state and economy is too complex for ordinary citizens and
must be left to the experts; the national security elites that say that the exigencies of
providing national security and carrying out contemporary warfare involving split-
second decisions necessitate a limitation of the classical freedoms of an earlier era
and insulation of the national security establishment from what they disdainfully regard
as the "vagaries" of civilian democratic politics. What is insidious about the behavior
of these elites is that even as they quietly maintain that a technocratic centralization is
the imperative of modern societies and that democratic practice must adjust this fact of
life, they opportunistically use the slogan of limiting and reducing government to hide
their technocratic agenda. I am of course speaking about the most influential sectors of
the Republican Party of the US, who cleverly use the Christian Right and the Cato
Institute small government types as canon fodder to advance their program of
conservative centralization.
Let me end by saying that with democracy facing a crisis globally, we cannot approach
the problem as if it were simply one of tinkering with processes that are essentially
sound and simply need sorting out. We are being faced with the classical questions of
democratic theory, the fundamental questions, to which we must frame ideas and
institutional solutions appropriate for the times. We must grasp and face with courage
the full dimensions of the threat posed to democracy, for it is our ability to confront them
that will provide the answer to the question of whether the global democratic revolution
will deepen or it will become a thing of the past, leaving future historians, as Rorty puts
it, with the puzzle why the golden age of democracy, like the age of the Antonines,
lasted only about two hundred years.
Notes
1. Richard Rorty, "Post Democracy," London Review of Books, Vol. 26, No. 7 (April 1,
2004), p. 10.
2. William Pfaff, "The Pentagon, not Congress or the President, Calls the Shots,"
International Herald Tribune, August 6, 2001.
3. Elaine Scarry, "Resolving to Resist," Boston Review, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Feb-Mar 2004),
p. 12.
4. See Walden Bello, "Parallel Crises: Dysfunctional Democracy in Washington and
Manila," in Back to the Future, edited by Corazon Villareal (Manila: American Studies
Association of the Philippines, 2003), pp. 80-91.
5. Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic
Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 59-60.
6. Ibid., p. 192.
7. Evelyn Huber and John Stephens, "The Bourgeoisie and Democracy: Historical and
Contemporary Perspectives from Europe and Latin America," Paper delivered at the
meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Continental Plaza Hotel,
Guadalajara, Mexico, April 17-19, 1997, p. 8.
8. See, among others, Maria Rocha Geisa. "Neo-Dependency in Brazil," New Left
Review, No. 16 (Second Series), July-August 2002, pp. 5-33; also Haggard and
Kaufman, pp. 193-196, 209-211.
9. "Don't Leave this Party yet," Business Week, Sept. 8, 2003, p. 63.
10. Is Lula's Honeymoon Winding Down?," Business Week, April 26, 2004, p. 31. See
also Roger Burbach, "Brazilian Fiscal Conservatives in Lula's Government under Attack
along with International Monetary Fund," Center for the Study of the Americas (CENSA),
Berkeley, Ca., March 22, 2004.
11. Geri Smith, "Democracy on the Ropes," Business Week, May 19, 2004.
12. Larry Diamond, "Is Pakistan the (Reverse) Wave of the Future?," in Larry Diamond
and Marc Plattner, The Global Divergence of Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2001), p. 358.
13. A.R. Kemal, "Structural Adjustment, Macroeconomic Policies, and Poverty Trends in
Pakistan," Paper delivered at the Asia and Pacific forum on Poverty: Reforming Policies
and Institutions for Poverty Reduction," Asian Development Bank, Manila, Feb. 5-9,
2001.
14. Keane Shore, "The Impact of Structural Adjustment Programs on Pakistan's Social
Development," IDRC Reports, June 7, 1999.
15. Rorty.